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  The agency’s modern history dates back to the enactment of the Food, Drug, and2
Cosmetic Act in 1938.  John P. Swann, History of the FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda.  But the federal government’s systematic regulation
of pharmaceuticals began with the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, when agency was
known as the Bureau of Chemistry.  The agency’s name was changed to the Food, Drug, and
Insecticide Administration in July 1927, and was shortened to its present form in July 1930.  Id.
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 A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to 
Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims
David A. Kessler and David C. Vladeck1
I.  Introduction
For most of its seventy-seven year history, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
regulated the drugs sold in the United States without any significant interaction with the world of
state-law damages litigation.    Nothing in the statutes the FDA administers suggests that they2
eliminate state damages actions for pharmaceutical products.  No appellate court, before or after
the advent of the FDA, has held that a state-law failure-to-warn claim for a prescription drug is
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 This article focuses on the FDA’s effort to persuade courts to find state-law failure-to-3
warn claims preempted.  It does not address the broader question of whether federal law
preempts other state-law claims that are advanced against drug companies, such as strict liability,
design defect, negligent manufacture, and breach of warranty.  As explained in more detail
below, because the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not contain an express
preemption provision for drugs, drug companies have generally not asserted preemption
defenses, and it is only recently, spurred on in part by the FDA, that companies have argued that
state-law failure-to-warn claims are impliedly preempted by virtue of the FDA’s approval of drug
labeling.  
 See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 167 (1989) (ascribing4
significance to Congress’ failure to provide for preemption); see also Robert S. Adler & Richard
A. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The Courts Run Amok, 59 MO. L. REV. 895, 924
(1994) (pointing out that Congress rejected a proposal to include a right of action for damages in
the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act because “a common law right of action (already)
exists.”).    
 Compliance with regulatory standards is the common defense raised in pharmaceutical5
product liability litigation.  See generally  Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance,
88 Geo. L.J. 2049 (2000); cf. Michael D. Green & William B. Schultz, Tort Law Deference to
FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 88 Geo L.J. 2119, 2122-23 (2000).  Drug companies did
not begin to raise preemption as a routine defense until after the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).  There, the Court held that certain state
damage claims for injuries alleged to have been caused by cigarette smoking were preempted by
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act because common law duties could impose
“requirements” akin to state positive law.  Id. at 521.  Cipollone also marked the first time that
the Court invoked preemption to nullify a state damage action where the effect of doing so was to
2
preempted by federal law.   And Congress has not acted to preempt or limit state damage actions,3
even though it has long been aware of tort litigation over drug products.  4
To be sure, there has been a steady stream of failure-to-warn cases brought against
pharmaceutical manufacturers by consumers injured by FDA-regulated drugs.  But historically
the FDA has stayed on the sidelines in that litigation.  Courts adjudicated those cases under the
ordinary rules that govern state damages actions, and the question of preemption rarely, if ever,
arose.   The FDA made no effort to intercede in those cases.  Indeed, the agency generally5
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leave injured parties without a remedy.  See generally David C. Vladeck, Preemption and
Regulatory Failure, 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 95, 105-06,112 (2006).   
 See 21 C.F.R. §  20.1; cf. In re: David A. Kessler, 100 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 6
 See Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 Food7
& Drug L.J. 7, 9 (1997); see also FDA, Prescription Drug Product Labeling; Medication Guide
Requirements, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,378, 66,384 (Dec. 1, 1998) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 208,
314, 601, 610) (requiring Medication Guides for products that are deemed to pose significant
public health concern) (“FDA does not believe that the evolution of state tort law will cause the
development of standards that would be at odds with the agency’s regulations.”); FDA, Final
Rule, Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content and Format for Labeling of Human
Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,437 (Jun. 26, 1979) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201
& 202) (“It is not the intent of the FDA to influence the civil tort liability of the
manufacturer...”).
3
resisted efforts by parties to force it to take sides in private litigation.   6
The agency’s practice of non-participation in litigation was in keeping with the FDA’s
view that its regulatory efforts could coexist with state-law damages claims by consumers injured
by drugs.  As the agency saw it, state-law failure-to-warn litigation did not interfere with the
agency’s regulatory efforts.  The agency is not the only institution that plays a role in monitoring
the emergence of unforeseen adverse events.  State damages litigation helps uncover and assess
risks that are not apparent to the agency during a drug’s approval process.  Until recently, in the
FDA’s view, this “feedback loop” enabled the agency to better do its job.    The agency also
wanted to avoid the “harsh implications” of eliminating judicial recourse for consumers injured
by dangerous drugs.7
The past few years have witnessed a seismic shift in FDA policy.  The agency now
maintains that state-law failure-to-warn cases threaten its ability to protect the public health.
According to the agency, a determination in civil litigation that an FDA-approved label fails
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 FDA, Final Rule, Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human8
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601).
 We address the FDA’s main argument supporting preemption below.  See infra at __-9
__.    But we do not canvass many of the arguments that have been raised against the FDA’s
position.  Among them are (1) the contention that the FDA’s position new position is not entitled
to deference (a) because Congress has not delegated to the FDA the authority to determine the
preemptive effect of labeling decisions on state law, see Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 915
(2006), (b) because the FDA did not develop its new position through notice and comment
rulemaking or other formal means, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27
(2001), and (c) because the agency’s new  position on preemption conflicts with its longstanding
contrary position, see Mead, 533 U.S. at 228; (2) the claim that the FDA’s new preemption
position can be applied, if at all, only prospectively, see Bowen v. Georgetown University
Hospital, 488 U.S. 204-208-09 (1988); and (3) the more general claim that the agency’s position
cannot be squared with basic principles of compensatory justice.  See generally  Thomas O.
McGarity, THE PREEMPTION WAR (Yale Univ. Press) (forthcoming).  
4
adequately to warn of risks may force manufacturers to add warnings that are not approved by the
FDA, thus rendering the product “misbranded.”  Even worse, the FDA says, adverse rulings
could force manufacturers to add warnings that the FDA considered and rejected — thus placing
manufacturers in the untenable position of having to violate federal law to avoid state damages
judgments.  For these reasons, the FDA now argues that the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA) impliedly preempts many failure-to-warn claims based on product labeling
approved by the FDA.  The FDA first announced this position in 2002, by filing amici briefs
asking courts to dismiss failure-to-warn cases.  More recently, the agency formalized this
position in the preamble to a 2006 rule that revises requirements for drug labeling.   8
This essay does not seek to review comprehensively the history of the FDA’s regulation
of drug labeling, its new position favoring preemption of failure-to-warn claims for drugs, or the
arguments that have been advanced in support of or in opposition to the FDA’s new policy.  9
Kessler & Vladeck, 96 Geo. L.J. ___ (2008) (forthcoming)
 See generally Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the10
Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L. VOL. 1 (2005), http://bepress.com/jtl/vol1/iss1/art4; Allison M.
Zieve & Brian Wolfman, The FDA’s Argument for Eradicating State Tort Law: Why Its Wrong
and Warrants no Deference, 21 TOXICS L. REP. 516 (2006); Mary J. Davis, The Final Battle for
Preemption: The FDA and Prescription Drug Labeling Product Liability Actions (Berkeley Elec.
Press, Working Paper No. 1591, 2006) http://www.bepress.comexpresso/eps/1591; Thomas O.
McGarity, THE PREEMPTION WAR (Yale Univ. Press) (forthcoming); but see Richard Epstein,
Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to
Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT L. VOL. 2 (2006) (making normative argument for a broad liability
shield for drug companies).  This essay leaves to one side the somewhat more complicated
question of preemption of claims relating to medical devices — more complicated only because
the 1976 Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act contain a
preemption provision.  See David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L.
REV. 95 (2005) (arguing that the MDA preemption provision is addressed only to conflicting
state positive law, not state tort or damages claims).    
5
Others have plowed that field, and have done it well.    10
Rather, this essay highlights what we believe are two of the most problematic aspects of 
the FDA’s pro-preemption position — one legal, the other practical — that do not stand out in
more comprehensive treatments of the issue.  The first point we make is that the FDA’s pro-
preemption arguments are based on a reading of the FDCA that, in our view, undermine the
incentives drug manufacturers have to change labeling unilaterally to respond to newly-
discovered risks, or to seek labeling changes from the FDA.  In fact, drug manufacturers have
significant authority — and indeed a responsibility — to modify labeling when hazards emerge
and may do so without securing the FDA’s prior approval.  The background possibility of failure-
to-warn litigation provides important incentives for drug companies to ensure that drug labels
reflect accurate and up-to-date safety information.  
Our second concern is that the FDA’s pro-preemption arguments are based on what we
see as an unrealistic assessment of the agency’s practical ability, once it has approved the
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   See Davis supra n._, at n.76 and accompanying text; Michelle Meadows, Promoting11
Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 Years, FDA CONSUMER (Jan./Feb. 2006),
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2006/106_cder.html; CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND
RESEARCH, REPORT TO THE NATION 2005: IMPROVING PUBLIC HEALTH THROUGH HUMAN
DRUGS 12 (Food and Drug Administration, 2005), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/rtn/2005/rtn2005.pdf (stating that the FDA approved 78 new
drugs and two new biologic products in 2005).  Many of the new approvals are for new
indications of drugs that have already been approved by the agency; only a handful of new drugs
are approved each year that are new molecular entities.  
6
marketing of a drug, to detect unforeseen adverse effects of the drug and to take prompt and
effective remedial action.  After all, there are 11,000 FDA-regulated drugs on the market
(including both prescription and over-the-counter drugs), with nearly one hundred more approved
each year.   The reality is that the FDA does not have the resources to perform the Herculean11
task of monitoring comprehensively the performance of every drug on the market.  Recent
regulatory failures have demonstrated the FDA’s shortcomings in this regard.  Given the FDA’s
inability to police drug safety effectively on its own, we question the wisdom of the FDA’s
efforts to restrict or eliminate the complementary discipline placed on the market by failure-to-
warn litigation.
Our differences with the FDA’s current policy can be traced to a difference in perspective
about the relevant agency decision that would be subject to review in a state-law failure-to-warn
case.  The FDA focuses on the approval process, suggesting that the FDA’s approval of a drug’s
labeling reflects the agency’s definitive judgment regarding risks that must be shielded from the
possible second-guessing that might take place in a failure-to-warn case.  Otherwise, the FDA
claims, court rulings adverse to drug companies might force companies to add warnings not
approved, or even rejected by, the FDA, thereby upsetting the balance of risks and benefits set by
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 This assumes, of course, that the drug’s sponsor has complied with the requirements12
governing new drug applications.  That is not always the case.  See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s
Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
 See INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE13
HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 36 (Alina Baciu, Kathleen Stratton & Shelia P. Burke, eds., The National
Academies Press 2006) available at http://www.iom.edu/CMS/3793/26341/37329.aspx
(hereinafter IOM REPORT) (estimating that drugs are generally tested on between 600 and 3,000
patients).   
7
the FDA when it approves a drug label.  Of course, the moment the FDA approves a new drug is
the one moment the agency is in the best position to be the exclusive arbiter of a drug’s safety
and effectiveness.  On that day, the FDA has had access to and has devoted considerable
resources to reviewing carefully all of the extant health and safety data relating to the drug.   On12
that day, and that day only, we agree that the FDA’s determinations about labeling ought not be
subject to re-examination by courts or juries in failure-to-warn cases. 
But in our view the FDA is wrong to focus on the moment of approval as determinative
of the preemption question.  The relevant time-frame is post-approval, and the question, in our
view, is what the drug company knew about a drug’s risks at the time the patient/plaintiff
sustained injury and what the company told the FDA.  After all, the FDA’s knowledge-base of
the risks posed by a new drug is far from static.  At the time of approval, the FDA’s knowledge-
base may be close to perfect, but it is also highly limited because, at that point, the drug has been
tested on relatively small populations of patients.   Once the drug enters the marketplace, risks13
that are relatively rare, that manifest themselves only after an extended period of time, or that
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 See, e.g., Hearings on Risk and Responsibility: The Roles of the FDA and14
Pharmaceutical Companies in Ensuring Safety of Approved Drugs, Like Vioxx Before the H.
Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 23, 55 (2005) (testimony of Steven Galston, Acting
Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA).   
 See IOM Report supra n. __,15   at 157; GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG
SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA’S POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT
PROCESS 10 (GAO-06-402) (March 2006), available at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-
402 (hereinafter GAO DRUG SAFETY).
 See Nagareda supra n. __, at 5-6 & n.16 (referring to this as “a process of ‘information16
updating’ over time”); Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products through
Tort Litigation, 95 Geo. L. J. 693, 711 (2007); Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory
Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2068-71 (2000) (ascribing to tort litigation an “educational
role”); Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance,
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 587, 612 (2005)
(“The tort system should remain free to redetermine product safety in the light of information
developed during litigation, because the FDA may not always uncover relevant safety
information and may not act quickly enough upon the information that it does receive”).  There
are feedback loops other than damages litigation, such as those governing adverse reporting, but,
as discussed later on, they have not proved adequate.  See infra at__.  
8
affect vulnerable subpopulations, begin to emerge.   These are often not risks foreseen by the14
drug’s manufacturer or the FDA and, for that reason, are not addressed on the label.  After a drug
is approved, the FDA cannot unilaterally compel labeling changes, but must instead negotiate
changes with the drug’s sponsor.   The FDA’s statutory and regulatory tools for gathering post-15
approval information are relatively crude and often ineffective, especially when contrasted with
its tools for information gathering prior to approval.  For that reason, the tort system has
historically provided important information about these newly-emerging risks to physicians,
patients and the FDA.  16
The FDA’s shift of position also comes at a particularly inopportune time for the agency. 
Although the FDA now argues for broad preemption of failure-to-warn claims, the agency’s
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 See GAO DRUG SAFETY supra n.__, at 18; IOM REPORT, supra n. __, at 153-54.17
 See FDA’s Drug Approval Process: Up to the Challenge? Hearings Before the S.18
Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 109th Cong., 10 (March 1, 2005) [hereinafter
Hearings: Up to the Challenge?] (joint statement of Sandra L. Kweder, M.D., Deputy Director,
Office of New Drugs, FDA and Janet Woodcock, M.D., Acting Deputy Commissioner for
Operations, FDA); see also Davis, supra n.__, at n.78 and accompanying text; FDA
Improvements in Drug Safety Monitoring, FDA Fact Sheet,
http://www.fda.gov/oc/factsheets/drugsafety.html (Feb. 15, 2005) (describing the creation of the
DSOB).
 See GAO DRUG SAFETY supra n. __, at 1, 6.19
9
assertion that it is able single-handedly to ensure drug safety has been undermined by a number
of highly-publicized regulatory failures.  Two recent independent studies of the FDA’s oversight
of drug safety — one by the Government Accountability Office and the other by the National
Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Medicine — have been critical of the agency’s ability to keep
unsafe drugs off the market and to respond effectively to unforeseen hazards with newly-
approved drugs.    Even the FDA has acknowledged its own limitations.  In the aftermath of the17
agency’s ineffective response to the reports of increased cardiac adverse events among Vioxx
users, the FDA in 2005 established the Drug Safety Oversight Board (DSOB) to better monitor
drugs on the market.    But, by all accounts, the DSOB is too poorly funded and staffed to do its18
job effectively.    In our view, these regulatory gaps in the FDA’s system undermine the19
agency’s case for preemption of state-law failure-to-warn claims.
II.  Background
Since the passage of the landmark 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, all drugs
must be evaluated and approved by the FDA before they may be marketed in the United States. 
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 In 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris amendments to the FDCA, Pub. L. No.20
87-781, 76 Stat. 788-89 (1962) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p)(1)-(2) & 355(b)-(d) (2000))
(sponsor of the drug has to provide substantial evidence of effectiveness for the product’s
intended use as precondition to approval.) 
 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b) (2006); see Davis, supra n. __, at n.77 and accompanying text;21
see also http://www.fda.gov/cder/cderorg/ond_reorg.htm (describing the Office of New Drugs);
http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/default.htm (describing the drug approval
process).
 See McGarity supra n. __, at 279; IOM REPORT, supra n. __, at 34.  22
 Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration’s Use of Postmarketing (Phase23
IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?, 61 Food & Drug L.J. 295, 297 (2006).  
 Id.24
10
Prior to 1962, the FDA’s review focused on the drug’s safety.  Since then, the drug’s sponsor
must demonstrate that the drug is “safe and effective” for its approved uses and that its labeling is
not “false or misleading.”    20
To obtain the FDA’s approval, a drug manufacturer must submit a “new drug
application” (NDA) for the agency’s review.  An NDA must include all information bearing on a
drug’s safety and effectiveness, including the results of animal testing, pharmacological studies,
and full reports of all of the clinical trials performed on human subjects.   Drug companies are21
responsible for supervising and controlling these studies.   Premarket human trials generally22
involve only a few thousand subjects and study design necessitates a careful control of the
conditions of the study.   These conditions are a far cry from those that face a drug once it is23
approved and widely prescribed by thousands of doctors.    New drugs designed to “address24
unmet medical needs” for “serious or life-threatening conditions” may receive accelerated or
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 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(1) (2006); see McGarity, supra note 8, at 279-80; GAO DRUG25
SAFETY, supra n. __, at 11; Struve, supra n. __, at 595.  See also 21 C.F.R. § 314.500-.520.  
 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006).  The FDA labeling regulations are extensive and include26
specific requirements on the format and content of drug labels.  See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.56, 201.57,
201.80.  The FDA revised these regulations in 2006.  See FDA, Final Rule, Requirements on
Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed.
Reg. 3922, 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601).  
 McGarity supra n. __, at 281; see Hearings: Up to the Challenge?, supra n. __, at 7927
(response to questions by Sen. Hatch by Sandra L. Kweder, M.D., Deputy Director, Office of
New Drugs, FDA).
 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i).  28
11
“fast track” consideration by the FDA.  These drugs are subject to shorter review periods and
may be approved based on less safety and effectiveness information than other drugs.   25
Because drug labeling provides doctors and other health care professionals information
needed to make informed prescribing decisions, the FDA’s NDA review includes a detailed
examination of the manufacturer’s proposal for the drug’s labeling.  The labeling must accurately
and fairly describe the drug’s intended uses.  Because all drugs have adverse side effects, the
labeling must also address the drug’s potential risks, contraindications, warnings, precautions and
adverse reactions.   The manufacturer and the FDA ordinarily discuss the content of these26
warnings in some detail during the approval process.   When the FDA approves a drug, it also27
approves the precise final version of the drug’s label.28
 When the application is complete, the FDA then determines whether it meets a number of
requirements set forth in the Act, including (1) whether the drug is “safe for use under the
conditions prescribed, recommended or suggested in the proposed labeling,” (2) whether there is
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  See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006).  The “substantial evidence” of safety and29
effectiveness required by the Act is “evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled
investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved.”  Id.  
 See IOM REPORT supra n. __, at 38; see also Louis Lasagna, Discovering Adverse Drug30
Reactions, 249 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 2224, 2225 (1983) (pointing out that a study would have to
have more than 600,000 subjects in order to have a ninety-five percent chance of detecting side
effects that might injure 1 or 2 subjects out of 1,000 tested); Bruce M. Psaty & Curt D. Furberg,
COX-2 Inhibitors - Lessons in Drug Safety, 352 New Eng. J. Med. 1133, 1134 (2005) (“In the
initial evaluation of the COX-2 inhibitors [the class of drugs that includes Vioxx], the use of
small, short-term trials, the exclusion of high-risk patients, and the methodologic inattention to
cardiovascular events all minimized the possibility of uncovering evidence of cardiovascular
harm.”). 
12
“substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under
the conditions of use” reflected on the proposed labeling, and (3) whether, “based on a fair
evaluation of all material facts, such labeling is false or misleading in any particular.”   If the29
statutory conditions are met, the FDA must approve the NDA.
The FDA’s approval of a drug does not spell the end of the agency’s oversight of the drug
or its labeling.  Prior to FDA approval, drugs are tested on relatively small populations of
patients, for durations rarely exceeding a year or two.  Thus, pre-approval testing generally is
incapable of detecting adverse effects that occur infrequently, have long latency periods, or affect
subpopulations not included or adequately represented in the studies (e.g., the elderly, ethnic
minorities and pregnant women).   As one expert put it, most clinical studies “can detect drug-30
related injuries that occur at a rate of between one in 500 and one in 1,000. Yet, if the drug is
used by 200,000 people . . . a serious adverse event appearing in as few as one in 10,000 people
is very significant, since it would occur 20 times.  These rare reactions can be identified only
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 William B. Schultz, How to Improve Drug Safety, Washington Post (Dec. 2, 2004),31
A35 (Mr. Schultz served as the FDA’s Deputy Commissioner for Policy from 1994 to 1998). 
Many drugs are used by far more patients. Vioxx, for example, was used by an estimated 20
million patients.  See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43867 (E.D. La.
July 3, 2007).  
 The FDA does not warrant the safety of the drugs it approves, and recognizes that even32
the most up-to-date and informative labels cannot avert adverse reactions.  But the incidence of
adverse reactions is cause for concern.  Adverse drug reactions are believed to be a leading cause
of death in the United States. See Joshua Lazarou, et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in
Hospitalized Patients: A Meta-analysis of Prospective Studies, 279 J. Am. Med. Ass’n
1200-1205 (1998) (estimating that adverse drug reactions are the fourth to sixth leading cause of
death in the United States, with an estimated 106,000 deaths from adverse drug reactions in
1994).  
 See GAO DRUG SAFETY, supra n. __, at 18, 28; IOM REPORT, supra n.__, at 51.33
 Reauthorization of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.34
on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107  Cong. 49 (2002) (statement of Rep.th
Henry A. Waxman); see also IOM REPORT, supra n. __, at 53 (reporting that although the FDA
receives more than 400,000 reports each year, this is only a “small fraction of all adverse effects
of drugs.”).  
13
after a drug has been widely used.”   For these reasons, the FDA’s approval of a drug is not  a31
warrant that the drug will not cause serious adverse effects even if properly used for its approved
purposes.   The FDA does have a program in place for post-market surveillance of approved32
drugs, but that program has been chronically under-funded by Congress and, according to recent
studies by the Institute of Medicine and the Government Accountability Office, has not
performed well.   And although the FDA strengthened its system for the collection of adverse33
reaction data in the early 1990s to solicit reports from health care providers and consumers, only
a small fraction of adverse reactions are reported to the FDA.    34
Because unanticipated adverse effects often emerge with approved drugs, there are
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 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b) (2006) (FDA must approve any “major” labeling change in35
advance); see also id. (defining what changes are deemed “major”).  
 21 C.F.R.  §§ 201.57(c)(6)(i); 201.80(e).36
 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A)-(C) (2006).  37
 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (2006).  38
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detailed procedures that regulate modifications to drug labeling.  Generally labeling changes
proposed by the manufacturers require prior FDA approval.   There are exceptions, however,35
and these exceptions are especially relevant to the preemption debate.  Most importantly,
“labeling must be revised to include a warning about a clinically significant hazard as soon as
there is reasonable evidence of a causal association with a drug; a causal relationship need not
have been definitively established.”   Statements that may be added without prior FDA approval36
are those (1) to “add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction,”
(2) to “add or strengthen a statement about drug abuse, dependence, psychological effect, or
overdosage,” (3) to “add or strengthen an instruction about dosage and administration that is
intended to increase the safe use of the product,” or (4) to “delete false, misleading, or
unsupported indications for use or claims of effectiveness.”    To be sure, the manufacturer must37
promptly inform the FDA of the change and submit a Supplemental New Drug Application that
the FDA then reviews after-the-fact.   But this “safety valve” option gives manufacturers the38
ability to provide physicians, health care professionals, and patients with up-to-date information
on an ongoing basis so long as a drug remains on the market, without the need to secure the
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 See generally 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.57(c)(6), 201.80(e) (2006). 39
 Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content and Format for Labeling for40
Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,447 (Jun. 26, 1979) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 201, 202).
 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(a); FDA, Final Rule, Requirements on Content and Format of41
Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan. 24,
2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601).  
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FDA’s advance approval.    And the FDA has long made it clear that its labeling rules are no39
obstacle to manufacturers providing warnings to doctors and patients through labeling,
advertising, or “Dear Doctor” letters as soon as the manufacturer discovers risks that are not
clearly stated on the label.  40
In 2006, the FDA issued revised labeling regulations to streamline labeling and make it
easier for health care providers to access key information.  The new rules add a number of
features, including a “Highlights” section of the label that sets forth the major warnings that are
described in more detail elsewhere on the label, a new format for labeling, and new requirements
to make hazard and adverse reaction information generally more accessible.    Consolidating41
important risk information on labeling will better ensure that physicians and patients are alerted
to the drug’s most serious potential side effects.  But nothing in the new regulations alters the
agency’s longstanding requirements that manufacturers revise their labels to protect public health
and may do so without first obtaining the agency’s approval.  
Nonetheless, the FDA contends in the preamble to the new regulations that state failure-
to-warn actions have “directly threatened the agency’s ability to regulate manufacturer
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 FDA, Final Rule, Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human42
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3933 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at
21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601).
 E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (defining the scope of the preemption provision in the Medical43
Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360k).   
 The FDA’s failure to address preemption directly in a regulation may be traced to the44
fact that, while there is an express preemption provision in the Medical Device Amendments of
1976, which specifically forbids states from imposing “requirements” in addition to or that are
different from those imposed by the FDA, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a), there is no counterpart provision
in the FDCA for drugs.  
  See In re Bextra and Celebrex Marketing Sales Practices and Product Liability45
Litigation, 2006 WL 2374742 at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (observing that “the FDA’s current view of
the preemptive effect of its labeling regulations is a 180-degree reversal of its prior position”); 
Davis, supra n.__, at n.140 and accompanying text; Brief for Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Cross-Appellee Motus, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-
55372, 02-55498), 2003 WL 22716063, at *12.  Additionally, the proposal for the rule change
stated that the new rules would not have a preemptive effect.  See FDA, Proposed Rule,
Prescription Drug Product Labeling; Medication Guide Requirements, 63 Fed. Reg. 66378,
66384 (Dec. 1, 1998) (“the written patient medication information provided does not alter the
duty, or set the standard of care for manufacturers....FDA does not believe that the evolution of
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dissemination of risk information for prescription drugs” and are therefore preempted.    In the42
past, when the FDA has claimed that its regulatory action has the effect of preempting state law,
it has said so explicitly in regulations adopted through notice and comment proceedings that have
the force of law.   But the FDA did not adopt a regulation that spells out the boundaries between43
federal and state law, as it has done for medical devices.   44
Rather, it is the preamble alone that addresses preemption, and there the FDA sketches
out its case for preemption.  Among other things, the agency asserts that its pro-preemption
position reflects the agency’s “longstanding view,” even though the available evidence suggests
otherwise.   The agency also reviews the pro-preemption position it has recently taken in a45
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state tort law will cause the development of standards that would be at odds with the agency’s
regulations.”).  The FDA itself  has acknowledged in amicus briefs that this pro-preemption
stance is a change from past views held by the agency.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellee, Horn v. Thoratec, 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004), 2004 WL 1143720
at *2 (“We acknowledge that...this [preemption] position represents a change for the United
States.”).   
 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and46
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935. 
 Id.47
  Id. at 3936.  This concession appears to be dictated by the Supreme Court’s decision in48
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996), which held that, a tort claim premised on
state-law duties “equal to, or substantially identical to,” duties imposed by federal law are not
preempted.  See also id. at 513 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).   The FDA
has amplified its position on the scope of preemption in a September 21, 2006, amicus
submission in Perry v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Civ. No. 05-5350 (E.D. Pa.), although the
agency is still less than clear about what claims might be permitted to proceed under its theory. 
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number of state failure-to-warn cases.  And the agency argues that its labeling requirements are
not minimum standards, as some courts had observed, but instead establish both a floor and a
ceiling.  Additional requirements imposed by state failure-to-warn rulings risk “erod[ing] and
disrupt[ing] the careful and truthful representations of the benefits and risks that prescribers need
to make appropriate judgments about drug use.  Exaggeration of risk could discourage
appropriate use of a beneficial drug.”   As the FDA sees it, many failure-to-warn claims are46
impliedly preempted, including those based on choices manufacturers make about what to put in
the “Highlights” portion of labels, and labeling claims that were proposed to the FDA but not
required by the agency at the time the claim arose.   The FDA does concede, however, that47
failure-to-warn claims based on state-law duties that parallel federal ones, or seek to enforce
federal duties, are not preempted.48
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In Perry, the FDA acknowledged that the defendant’s argument “that federal preemption bars
any failure-to-warn claim premised on a drug manufacturer’s failure to provide a warning not
contained in the drug’s approved labeling” is “incorrect.”  Id. at 11.  The FDA further noted that
it “has not attempted to ‘occupy the field’ of prescription drug labeling, and state tort liability for
failure to warn does not necessarily prevent FDA from carrying out its regulatory goals.  Federal
regulations explicitly provide for labeling changes to be made to warn of new hazards or cautions
relating to a drug without prior FDA approval.  Under this regulatory scheme, preemptive
conflict does not exist in every instance in which state tort law seeks to impose liability for the
failure to provide a warning not affirmatively mandated by the FDA.”  Id.  Under this approach,
it appears that the FDA would not necessarily object to claims that a manufacturer has failed to
provide a warning about a newly-discovered risk that the FDA has not considered, so long as the
warning would not render the drug misbranded. 
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III.   FDA Labeling Determinations Are Subject To Constant Reevaluation and Revision
and Failure-to-Warn Litigation Does Not Threaten to Displace the FDA’s Role as
Final Decision-Maker Regarding a Drug’s Label.  
As noted above, one cornerstone of the FDA’s preemption argument is its claim that
agency decisions regarding a drug’s labeling, made at the time of approval, are essentially set in
stone and should therefore not be reviewed, in any way, by a court in a failure-to-warn case.  The
FDA also cites its expertise in balancing the benefits and risks of pharmaceuticals.  According to
the FDA, labeling decisions are often difficult and require the agency to engage in a complex
balancing of interests.  Warnings that overstate or exaggerate risks are no more help to physicians
and patients than warnings that downplay risks or side effects.  Striking the right balance takes
expertise and judgment.  For these reasons, the FDA claims, the final say over drug labeling must
be left to the manufacturer and the FDA, and should not be subject to second-guessing by courts.  
We agree that labeling decisions are often fraught with complexity and that the FDA
should have the final word on drug labeling.  We do not doubt that if a state enacted a drug
labeling law that purported to compel drug manufacturers to add warnings unapproved by the
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 In fact, in just such a case, the California Supreme Court rejected, on conflict49
preemption grounds, the argument that California’s Proposition 65 could require additional
warning labels on certain drug products.  Dowhal v. SmithKine Beecham, 88 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2004).   
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FDA, such an effort would properly be struck down on conflict preemption grounds.   49
Our claim does not challenge the FDA’s supremacy over labeling.  But we do not agree
with the FDA’s conclusion about preemption of failure-to-warn claims.  In our view, the factors
the FDA cites to support its position do not justify insulating labeling decisions from state
failure-to-warn litigation, for two related reasons.  First, failure-to-warn litigation does not
challenge the FDA’s decision to approve a label for a new drug; instead, it challenges the
company’s failure to revise its labeling to warn about risks that were unknown at the time the
drug was approved, or risks that turn out to be more grave than the company and the FDA
thought at the time of approval.  Second, failure-to-warn litigation does not seek to force labeling
changes or to substitute a jury or  court’s judgment for the FDA’s; failure-to-warn litigation seeks
compensation for injured patients.
A.  Failure-to-Warn Claims Seek Compensation, Not Injunctions to Force       
Labeling Changes, and Preemption of Failure-to-Warn Claims Would
      Remove Incentives for Drug Manufacturers to Update Labels.  
The first and most serious flaw in the FDA’s interference argument is the assumption that 
failure-to-warn litigation seeks to supplant the FDA as final decision-maker as to the content and
format of drug labeling.  That is not the case. The FDCA gives that authority to the FDA and no
one else.  Failure-to-warn litigation does not undercut that authority.  Failure-to-warn litigation
challenges the company’s failure to warn doctors and patients about a risk and seeks money
damages for injuries caused by the lack of an adequate warning.  Plaintiffs do not seek
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injunctions or other court decrees forcing a labeling change; they seek compensation for their
injuries.  
In the typical failure-to-warn case, the plaintiff alleges that the drug’s label failed
adequately to warn of risks that were unknown, or poorly understood, at the time the drug was
approved but were evident at the time the plaintiff was injured.  In that kind of case, a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff — or even serial plaintiffs’ judgments — may cause one or both of two
things to happen, neither of which impairs the FDA’s decisional authority.  First, the company
might agree that the risk is worthy of a warning label and either ask the FDA to approve a
labeling change or decide to add the warning and then seek the FDA’s approval.  Or second, as a
result of the information that comes to light during the litigation, the FDA might recognize the
risk as one requiring a warning and initiate discussions with the company to bring about such a
change.  Either way, the overriding public health interest is served, and the FDA exercises
control over the labeling.
Even if the warning at issue was one considered and rejected by the FDA at the time of
approval, that does not mean that a failure-to-warn case seeks to force the substitution of a court-
required label for the label approved by the FDA.  As noted above, because pre-approval testing
is subject to serious limitations, post-approval use in large numbers of patients brings about a
deeper understanding of the nature and magnitude of the risks posed by the drug.  In a failure-to-
warn case involving such a risk, a plaintiff’s verdict might well prompt the company and the
FDA to reconsider the appropriateness of a warning, even though they rejected it earlier on the
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 The Supreme Court has noted that state damages actions “may aid the exposure of new50
dangers associated” with the product and prompt the agency to “decide that revised labels are
required in light of new information that has been brought to its attention.”  Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 451 (2005) (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d
1529, 1541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).  
 See, e.g., id. 51
  See, e.g., Lasser, et al., Timing of New Black Box Warnings and Withdrawals for52
Prescription Medications, 287 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 2215, 2218 (2002); Aaron Kesselheim & Jerry
Avorn, The Role of Litigation in Defining Drug Risks, 287 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 308, 310 (2007)
(citing examples). 
 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 n.8; see also n.__, supra.  53
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basis of less complete data.   As the Supreme Court has frequently observed, tort law often50
informs regulatory decisions,  and the FDA has often acted in response to information that has51
come to light in state damages litigation.52
But preemption would not be justified even if, in the midst of failure-to-warn litigation,
the FDA reviews all of the new safety information and determines that a labeling change is not
warranted.  Of course, should such a case arise, the drug company would have a powerful
defense.  It would be able to argue to the jury that it complied with applicable FDA requirements
and that the plaintiff is complaining about the absence of a warning the FDA had rejected. 
Moreover, as the FDA acknowledges, the FDCA does not expressly preempt state-law damages
claims, or even occupy the field of drug regulation.   Accordingly, the only preemption argument53
available to the company and the FDA is that such claims are impliedly preempted because they
either actually conflict with federal law or erect an impermissible obstacle to the achievement of
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 See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 109 (2000); Geier v. American Honda54
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873-74 (2000).
 Conflict preemption requires something more coercive than paying a judgment.  As an55
example of conflict preemption, Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Lohr said “[i]magine that, in
respect to a particular hearing aid component, a federal MDA regulation requires a 2-inch wire,
but a state agency regulation requires a 1-inch wire. If the federal law, embodied in the ‘2-inch’
MDA regulation, pre-empts the state ‘1-inch’ agency regulation, why would it not similarly
pre-empt a state-law tort action that premises liability upon the defendant manufacturer's failure
to use a 1-inch wire.” 518 U.S. at 504 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Similarly, in Geier v. American
Honda Co., the Court found that a claim that a passenger vehicle that was not equipped with
airbags was defectively designed preempted because permitting it go forward would conflict with
NHTSA’s decision to provide for a gradual phase-in of air-bags.  529 U.S. 861, 867-71 & 875
(2000).
 544 U.S. 431, 445 (2005); see also Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 6456
(2002); Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1988); Vladeck supra n. __, at
115-16.  
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federal objectives.   54
Permitting failure-to-warn litigation to proceed does not pose a conflict with federal law
or threaten the fulfillment of federal objectives.  To begin with, there is no reason why a drug
manufacturer cannot comply with both FDA-required labeling and pay a state damage judgment
based on a determination that the labeling failed to adequately warn of a discrete risk.   The legal55
test is actual, irreconcilable conflict — not simply the burden of incurring the expense of an
adverse judgment.  As the Supreme Court recently explained in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,
“a requirement is a rule of law that must be obeyed; an event, such as a jury verdict, that merely
motivates an optional decision [whether to add a new warning to a drug label] is not a
requirement” triggering preemption.   An adverse ruling in a failure-to-warn case would not56
require the manufacturer to do anything other than pay money damages.  Of course, a
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 Consider one example.  As explained in detail below, see infra n. __, manufacturers of57
a certain class of widely-prescribed antidepressants, known as “selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors,” or “SSRIs,” were the target of failure-to-warn cases brought by families whose
children committed suicide while taking the drug.  The plaintiffs claimed, and some courts and
juries agreed, that the drugs should have warned of the association between use of the drug and
an increased risk of suicidal thoughts, ideations and acts.  Despite having to pay judgments to
prevailing plaintiffs, the companies resisted calls to change their warnings, and did so only after
being directed to do so by the FDA.  
 Cf.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, Horn v.58
Thoratec, 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004), 2004 WL 1143720 at *2-3 (in a case involving a medical
device, the FDA stated that “the United States has a substantial stake in ensuring that state
common law tort judgements do not interfere with implementation of this important federal
scheme [of regulating safety and effectiveness]....A contrary rule would undermine overall public
health protection.”); see also FDA, Final Rule, Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling
for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3928 (Jan. 24, 2006)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601). 
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manufacturer might decide to take measures to avoid future adverse rulings, including adding a
warning to the drug’s labeling.  But a manufacturer could also rationally decide to do nothing,
reasoning that the prospect of a recurrence is too remote to justify a labeling change, or that the
cost of defending cases and paying judgments is less than the sales that would be lost as a result
of making a labeling change.   57
Nor would an adverse ruling in a state failure-to-warn case stand as an obstacle to federal
objectives.  As articulated by the FDA, its overarching objective is to safeguard the public’s
health by ensuring that drug labeling is uniform, accurate, and fairly addresses the possible risks
of a drug without overstating those risks.    But an adverse ruling in a state failure-to-warn case,58
even where the FDA has had access to all of the information before the court and believes that
the plaintiff’s claim is unsubstantiated, does not jeopardize that interest.  If the FDA has
considered the labeling change addressed in the litigation and found that it is unwarranted, the
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  Strict liability theory acknowledges that dangerous products will cause harm on59
occasion, but on balance, the product’s benefits to society outweigh its risks.  The product
remains on the market, its manufacturer is responsible for warning users of the product’s risks,
but the manufacturer also compensates people injured using the product.  See generally DAVID G.
OWEN, JOHN E. MONTGOMERY & MARY J. DAVIS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 474 (Foundation Press 2007).
 See Kesselheim & Avorn, supra n.__, at 310 (reporting that discovery in civil litigation60
demonstrated the manufacturer’s resistance to the FDA’s effort to persuade the manufacturer to
place a strong warning on the drug dexfenfluramine).  Of course, if the “harshness” of the result
factors into the preemption analysis, it bears mention that the abolition of a failure-to-warn
remedy — as the FDA advocates — would be especially harsh to individual patients who are
injured by drugs that do not carry adequate warnings of risk but would then be deprived of
compensation for their injuries.  
 See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 592 A.2d 1176, 1193 (N.J. 1991) (“for the FDA61
to have prevented a drug manufacturer from warning the public of a newly-discovered danger
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court cannot compel a labeling change.  The company may be forced to pay a price for the FDA’s
decision, but the court’s ruling will not displace the FDA’s authority over the label.  59
This result may appear harsh, but in reality there are few instances in which the company
(which is trying to sell its drug) wants a stronger label than the FDA and the FDA (which is
trying to safeguard public health) resists the change.   The FDA does not identify such a case. 60
And if such a case arose, the company would have an out: the FDCA gives it the authority to
change its label unilaterally to add the warning addressed in the litigation, so long as the
amended label is not false and misleading, and then file a Supplemental New Drug Application
seeking the FDA’s after-the-fact approval.  In such an instance, it is likely that the FDA and the
company would strive to avoid an impasse over the labeling.  To be sure, the FDA would have
the authority to reject such a labeling change, but we are not aware of cases in which the FDA
has refused any change to a label when pressed for a stronger warning by a manufacturer.   And,61
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pending development of unequivocal factual evidence of adverse reaction in man ‘would seem
anomalous’”). 
 This is not necessarily surprising.  Bringing a misbranding action would consume62
substantial agency resources, the agency would bear the burden of proving that the drug was
misbranded, and because the manufacturer has superior information about a drug’s performance
after the drug’s approval, the agency might be at an informational disadvantage.  The agency has
brought  successful misbranding actions for both injunctions and restitution against companies
selling unapproved drugs or approved drugs for unapproved uses.  See, e.g., United States v.
Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2005) (upholding restitution and injunction order
against company selling shark cartilage as cancer treatment); FDA Consumer, Drug Maker to
Pay $430 Million in Fines, Civil Damages (July/Aug. 2004) (reporting that Warner-Lambert had
agreed to plead guilty and to pay $430 million to resolve criminal and civil charges stemming
from its promotion of unapproved uses of Neurotin) available at
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2004/404_wl.html.   But as best as we can tell, the FDA has
rarely if ever brought a misbranding action against the manufacturer of an approved drug being
promoted only for approved uses.  
 21 U.S.C. § 332(b) (providing jury trial right in injunction actions brought by FDA);63
see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 333, 334(b).
 The FDA’s inability to force a labeling change to Vioxx is only the most recent, and64
perhaps most widely publicized, example of this problem.  Dr. Sandra Kweder, Deputy Director
of the FDA’s Office of New Drugs, said in testimony in a Senate Hearing that safety concerns
over Vioxx prompted the FDA to convene an advisory committee meeting in 2001 to examine
whether the drug raised the risk of heart attacks and strokes.  But despite the panel’s
recommendation that Vioxx’s label be changed to reflect this risk, it took more than a year of
negotiations between the FDA and Merck before the company changed Vioxx’s label.  “They
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as best as we can tell, the FDA has never brought a misbranding claim against a company in
those circumstances.   Ironically, if it did, the agency would be back to where it started, because62
the ultimate decision-maker in a misbranding action would be the jury and not the FDA.   63
More serious is the problem the FDA barely mentions.  Manufacturers often resist
labeling changes the FDA believes are needed due to emerging safety concerns.  For instance, the
FDA acknowledges that it took over a year to persuade Merck, the manufacturer of Vioxx, to add
a warning of the risks of heart attack and stroke to Vioxx’s label.   During the lengthy64
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rejected many of our proposals,” Dr. Kweder told the Senate.  “We don’t have the authority to
tell a company, ‘This is how your label has to look.’” Instead, she said, “[w]e have to negotiate
with the company the specific language of how things should be worded, the placement, those
kinds of things, after talking to them.” Hearings: Up to the Challenge?, supra n __, at 23.  And
the Vioxx negotiations show that the FDA does not always get its way.  The FDA had pushed
Merck for a strong warning on Vioxx, but settled for a much weaker warning that simply said
that patients with a history of heart disease should use Vioxx with caution.  See Gardiner Harris,
FDA Official Admits “Lapses” on Vioxx, N.Y. Times, A15 (March 2, 2005); Jim Drinkard, Label
Quibble Helped Cause Vioxx Lapse, USA Today, (March 1, 2005).  This problem is not a new
one.  See, e.g., Salmon v. Parke-Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362-63 (4th Cir. 1975) (“the 
F.D.A. suggested, and Parke, Davis opposed, language that would tell physicians that they ‘must’
take certain precautions and ‘must not’ incur needless risks.”).  
 See id.  See also IOM REPORT, supra n.__, at 157; see also Gardiner Harris, F.D.A.65
Issues Strict Warnings on Diabetes Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 7, 2007, at A1 (announcing that
prominent warnings about the risks of heart attacks would be placed on two diabetes drugs and
reporting that the new warnings came several years after risks were known).
 As the Vioxx example shows, when confronted with an emerging threat from an66
approved drug, a company has to make a difficult economic choice — add a warning to the
drug’s label, almost certainly at the cost of lower sales, or resist a labeling change, recognizing
that the company may be subject to future failure-to-warn litigation.  It is hard to imagine that
Merck did not make that calculus as evidence of Vioxx’s heart attack and stroke risk mounted.  If
the threat of litigation is taken off the table, companies will have even less incentive to make
needed labeling changes.   
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negotiations, no change was made to Vioxx’s label, and in the end, the FDA settled for a weaker
warning than it had proposed.  As noted, the FDA does not have statutory authority to compel
manufacturers to make labeling changes, but must instead rely on its power of persuasion, backed
up by the FDA’s authority to seek withdrawal of the drug’s NDA or to file a misbranding action. 
The FDA generally gets its way, but the negotiations with manufacturers are often quite lengthy
and frequently result in compromise decisions, as was the case with Vioxx.   Removing the65
possibility of failure-to-warn litigation, as the FDA seeks to do, would further weaken the
incentives a drug company has to comply with an FDA-requested labeling change.66
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 FDA, Final Rule, Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human67
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at
21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601) 
 88 P. 3d 1 (Cal. 2004) cited in id.68
 In re Paxil Litigation, 2002 WL 1940708 (C.D. Cal. 2002), was a class action brought69
against GlaxoSmithKline by users of Paxil who sought to enjoin the company from advertising
that “Paxil is not habit forming.”  Although the court initially agreed to enter injunctive relief, it
reversed that ruling  two months later.  2002 WL 31375497 (C.D. Cal. 2002).  Bernhardt v.
Pfizer, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16963 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), was an action seeking an order
requiring that a “Dear Doctor” letter to be sent to physicians.  The court found that the plaintiffs
lacked standing and that the injunctive relief sought was preempted by the FDCA. 
 The brevity of the FDA’s description is not altogether surprising because even the70
FDA’s “best cases” do not provide unalloyed support for its position.  The case that apparently
27
B.  The FDA’s Justifications for Preemption are Legally Flawed.  
In defending its preemption position, the FDA cites a handful of examples in the Federal
Register preamble to support its claim that recent lawsuits have “threatened the agency’s ability
to regulate ... risk information for prescription drugs.”   But these examples do not support the67
agency’s interference claim.  The chief case the FDA relies on, Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham,68
was not a product liability case.  Instead, it was an action for injunctive relief brought to compel a
drug company to comply with labeling requirements imposed under California’s Proposition 65. 
Relying on conflict preemption principles, the California Supreme Court held that state-required
warnings presented an actual conflict with FDA-imposed labeling requirements, and thus state
law had to yield.  Two other cases the FDA cites also involved state law actions to compel
changes to drug labeling; neither succeeded.   Only a few of the FDA’s illustrative cases are69
failure-to-warn actions, and the FDA offers no explanation of how these cases threatened the
FDA’s authority to control the content of drug labeling.   None sought to compel a labeling70
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disturbed the FDA the most — Motus v. Pfizer — could well be the bellwether case for those
arguing against preemption.  Motus was a damage action brought by the widow of a man who
committed suicide after taking the anti-depressant Zoloft.  Although there were a number of
reports linking anti-depressants in Zoloft’s class of drugs (“selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors,” or “SSRIs”) with suicide, the FDA rejected efforts by consumer and patient groups to
add a warning for this class of drugs reflecting that possibility.  127 F. Supp. 2d 1085,1089-91
(C.D. Cal. 2000).  Although the district court initially rejected Pfizer’s preemption defense, id., it
later granted Pfizer summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s inability to prove causation, 196
F. Supp. 2d 984 (C.D. Cal. 2001).  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.  2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1944 (9th
Cir. Cal., Feb. 9, 2004).  There were many failure-to-warn cases against the drug companies that
sold SSRIs.  A few district courts agreed with the FDA’s pro-preemption argument.  See, e.g.,
Dusek v. Pfizer, Inc., 2004 WL 2191804 (S.D. Tex. 2004), Needleman v. Pfizer, Inc., 2004 WL
1773697 (N.D. Tex. 2004).  Many did not.  See, e.g., Zikis v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 WL 3019409
(N.D. Ill. 2005); NcNellis v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 WL 3752269 (D. N.J. 2005); Witczak v. Pfizer,
Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726 (D. Minn. 2005); Cartwright v. Pfizer, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 876 (E.D.
Tex. 2005).  What is important about Motus and similar cases is that, although Pfizer lost on
preemption, the FDA did not change the labeling for SSRIs directly as a response to the
litigation, and no one could plausibly argue that it had an obligation to do so.  On the other hand,
cases like Motus provided the FDA with substantial information about the correlation between
SSRIs and suicidal behavior.  Ultimately, after reexamining its position, the FDA ordered that 
labels of SSRIs include prominent warnings about the risk of suicide.  See Food and Drug
Administration, FDA Public Health Advisory: Suicidality in Children and Adolescents Being
Treated with Antidepressant Medications (Oct. 15, 2004); Food and Drug Administration, FDA
Public Health Advisory: Suicidality in Adults Being Treated with Antidepressant Medications
(June 30, 2005).  The FDA recently proposed to add warnings for young adult patients.  Food and
Drug Administration, FDA News: FDA Proposes New Warnings about Suicidal Thinking,
Behavior in Young Adults Who Take Antidepressant Medication (May 2, 2007)
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2007/NEW01624.html.
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change; no case resulted in a labeling change; and the only relief sought by the plaintiffs in these
cases was money damages for injuries caused by the drugs.  
Nor does the FDA address how its pro-preemption argument can be reconciled with the
fact that the FDCA and the agency’s own regulations give manufacturers significant leeway to
revise labeling to reflect up-to-date risk information about a “clinically significant hazard”
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 See supra at ___. 71
 See Richard A. Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REV.72
1, 87, 107-08 (1973) (arguing that consumers should not bear the risk of unsafe medications, that
some form of no-fault system should be developed to compensate injured consumers, and never
suggesting that companies might have a preemption defense based on FDA-approved labels or
that such a liability regime would impair the FDA’s ability to protect the public). 
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without first obtaining the FDA’s permission.   To be sure, the FDA’s approval must be sought71
after-the-fact.  But the FDA’s pro-preemption argument rests on the proposition that it, and it
alone, determines drug labeling.  That just is not so.  The process is a dynamic one in which the
manufacturer also plays a critical role.  The ability of manufacturers to make labeling changes
first and then seek the FDA’s approval undercuts the FDA’s claim.  
That the FDA had to struggle to find a handful of isolated (and ambiguous) cases to make
out its interference claim also raises a red flag.  There is a seventy-seven year history of federal
regulation of drug safety, and yet all the evidence the FDA can muster in support is, at most, a
few cases that it claims raise a specter of interference, even though there are hundreds of failure-
to-warn cases brought each year.  The FDA does not cite jury verdicts that actually disrupted the
agency’s functioning, let alone explain how the agency has been able to carry out its
responsibilities in the face of this steady procession of failure-to-warn cases.   72
Nor does the FDA’s account come to grips with the other side of the ledger, that is, the
benefits that flow to the FDA from failure-to-warn cases.  Failure-to-warn litigation has often
preceded and clearly influenced FDA decisions to modify labeling, and, at times, to withdraw
drugs from the market.  Preemption of failure-to-warn cases would thus come at a high price —
information  provided by this litigation would be lost to the FDA.  That is a serious trade-off
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 It is a trade-off that other commentators argue would short-change the FDA.  See73
generally Nagardea, supra n._, at 6 (expressing concern that preemption may do “too little in
return” to benefit the FDA); cf. Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products
Through Tort Litigation, 96 Geo. L. J. 693, 711-13 (2007) (explaining the informational
advantages of litigation).  
 See, e.g., Karen Lasser, et al., Timing of New Black Box Warnings and Withdrawals for74
Prescription Medications, 287 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 2215, 2218 (2002); Kesselheim & Avorn
supra n.__ , at 310 (citing examples). 
 See Ensuring Drug Safety: Where Do We Go From Here? Hearings before the S.75
Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 109  Cong., 4-6 (March 3, 2005) (testimonyth
of Janet Woodcock, M.D., Acting Deputy Commissioner for Operations, FDA); Requirements on
Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed.
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which at least merits the FDA’s consideration.   The FDA has benefitted considerably from the73
interplay between state damages litigation and federal regulatory efforts.  We see no reason to
disturb this system.    74
IV.  The FDA’s Post-Approval Monitoring System Cannot, By Itself, Assure Drug Safety
and Failure-to-Warn Litigation Provides an Important Backstop. 
In addition to our concerns about the FDA’s legal position, we also have reservations
about the FDA’s preemption position because it depends on the proposition that the FDA is
capable of policing the marketplace effectively on its own.  Again, the FDA views the
preemption question through the prism of the initial approval process, and spends little time 
addressing its ability to monitor drug safety post-approval.   In its public statements, the FDA
paints a confident self-portrait, describing itself as capable of single-handedly monitoring drug
safety, of reacting swiftly and effectively to warning signs that a drug may pose unanticipated
risk, and possessing the personnel, resources and statutory authority it needs to safeguard the
public health.    75
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Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601); Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, Horn v. Thoratec, 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004),
2004 WL 1143720 at *1-2. 
 FDA News, The Food and Drug Administration Celebrates 100 Years of Service to the76
Nation (Jan. 4, 2006) available at: http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2006/NEW01292.html.
 Food and Drug Administration, An Overview of the FDA (available at77
www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/fda101/sld015.html (last visited July 11, 2007).  In addition to drug
safety, these employees also review applications to market new medical devices, monitor the
safety of the medical devices on the market, inspect drug and device manufacturing facilities,
inspect virtually all of the non-meat food products sold in this country (including a rising flood of
imported foods), inspect food processing and storage facilities, regulate dietary supplements,
oversee the safety of the blood supply and tissues for transplantation, regulate radiologic and
biologic products, and veterinary medicines and cosmetics.  Id.   
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We question whether the FDA’s resources and performance match its rhetoric.   The case
for preemption must be examined in light of a clear-eyed appraisal of the FDA’s ability to assure
the safety of the drugs being marketed in the United States.  As we see it, the reality departs from
the one described by the FDA.  In our view, the FDA is hamstrung by resource limitations and
gaps in the agency’s statutory authority.  The FDA benefits from failure-to-warn litigation that
forces the disclosure of information that otherwise would be unavailable to the agency.  
A.  The FDA Faces Resource Limitations.  
An agency can go only so as far its resources can take it, and the FDA, like other federal
regulatory agencies, faces serious resource constraints.  The FDA now regulates products that
amount to one-quarter of consumer spending in the United States.   But it has only 9,00076
employees nationwide.   Not surprisingly, there are resource limitations that impair the agency’s77
ability to detect adverse reactions and to take prompt and effective measures once previously
unidentified risks surface.  The Institute of Medicine reported in 2006 that the FDA “lacks the
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 IOM REPORT, supra n. __,  at 193.  78
 U NION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, VOICES OF SCIENTISTS AT FDA: PROTECTING79
PUBLIC HEALTH DEPENDS ON INDEPENDENT SCIENCE 2 (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2006); 
see also DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, FDA’S
REVIEW PROCESS FOR NEW DRUG APPLICATIONS, 12, 19 (March 2003) available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-01-00590.pdf (finding that significant numbers of FDA’s
own physicians and scientists reported pressure to recommend that drugs be approved even when
they had reservations about safety or efficacy, and that two-thirds of the agency’s drug reviewers  
lacked confidence that the agency “adequately monitors the safety of prescription drugs once they
are on the market.”). 
 See, e.g., Diedtra Henderson, Drug Makers Lobby U.S. to Hike FDA Funds, BOSTON80
GLOBE, July 13, 2006, at E1.
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resources needed to accomplish its large and complex mission today, let alone to position itself
for an increasingly challenging future.”   FDA doctors and scientists share this view; 70 percent78
believe that the FDA lacks sufficient resources to protect the public health, and two-thirds worry
that the FDA is not adequately monitoring the safety of drugs once they are on the market.  79
Even the pharmaceutical industry has urged Congress to increase FDA appropriations to shore up
its flagging drug safety resources.80
Resource constraints are especially acute with the agency’s post-marketing surveillance
efforts.  According to the most recent statistics available, the FDA’s Office of New Drugs
(OND), which reviews NDAs, employs over 1,000 physicians and scientists to review the
approximately 100 new NDAs each year and to supervise post-marketing studies.  In contrast,
FDA’s Office of Drug Safety, the unit charged with monitoring adverse events associated with
the 3,000 prescription drugs (and 11,000 drugs altogether) the agency has approved over the
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 Hearings: Up to the Challenge?, supra n. __, at __ (Joint Statement of Sandra L.81
Kweder, M.D., Deputy Director, Office of New Drugs, and Janet Woodcock, M.D., Acting
Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Food and Drug Administration, to the Committee on
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, U.S. Senate) (March 1 & 3, 2005) (reporting that for
fiscal year 2005 the Office of Drug Safety had about 90 full time employees, but projecting for
fiscal year 2006 an increase to about 110 full time employees) available at:
http://www.fda.gov/ola/2005/drugsafety0301.html (table).   
 As originally enacted, the user fee legislation restricted the use of fees to the costs of82
“the process for the review of new drug applications.”  21 U.S.C. § 379h(g)(1)-(2) (2000).  More
recent user fee legislation has relaxed that requirement somewhat.  21 U.S.C. § 379g(6)(F)
(Supp. 2004) (providing for the use of PDUFA funds “In the case of drugs approved after
October 1, 2002, under human drug applications or supplements: collecting, developing, and
reviewing safety information on the drugs including adverse event reports, during a period of
time after approval of such applications or supplements, not to exceed three years.”)  One result
of user-fee funding is that the new drug approval process has remained fully funded.  On the
other hand, funding for other FDA programs has not kept pace.  See generally Prescription Drug
User Fee Act (PDUFA); Public Meeting, 65 Fed. Reg. 47,993, 47,994 (Aug. 4, 2000).   
  See n.__, supra.  83
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years, has around 100 professional employees.   Part of the disparity is historic, but part of it81
stems from the fact that when Congress initially authorized “user fees” — fees companies pay for
NDA reviews — it  directed the FDA to use the fees to support the review of new drug
applications, and nothing else.   When Congress reauthorized the user fee statute in 2002, it82
eased the restrictions on the FDA’s use of the funds, but the resource disparity remains.   83
B.  Statutory Gaps Hamper FDA’s Post-Approval Data Gathering.
But it is not just resource limitations that impair the agency’s ability to engage effectively
in post-approval surveillance.  The agency is also hamstrung by statutory gaps that limit the data
demands it may make on drug companies after a new drug is approved.  As noted above, pre-
approval clinical testing cannot identify all of the possible adverse effects associated with new
Kessler & Vladeck, 96 Geo. L.J. ___ (2008) (forthcoming)
 Congress has understood these limitations for decades.  Shortly after the 196284
Kefauver-Harris Amendments went into effect, then FDA Commissioner George P. Larrick
explained to a House panel that “even the most extensive” clinical trials will reveal only a
fraction of the information that emerges once the drug is generally marketed.  See Drug Safety
(Part One) Hearings before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. On Gov’t Operations, 88  Cong., 152th
(1964).  This history is discussed in Steenburg, supra n. __, at 297.
 Merrill, supra n. __, at 20; see generally Steenburg, supra n.__, 298 & nn.23-24.85
 Steenburg, supra n.__, at 299.86
 See Steenberg, supra n. __, at 324 (“In 1988, FDA was the first agency in the world to87
approve a given drug only four percent of the time.  That figure rose to sixty-six percent in
1998.”).  Faster drug reviews, however, may spawn safety problems as well.  In 2002, the
General Accounting Office, now the Government Accountability Office, (GAO) found that “a
higher percentage of drugs has been withdrawn from the market for safety reasons since [user fee
legislation] was enacted.”  GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION:
EFFECT OF USER FEES ON DRUG APPROVAL TIMES, WITHDRAWALS, AND OTHER AGENCY
ACTIVITIES 4 (GAO-02-958) (Sept. 2002) available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02958.pdf.  See also Hearings: Where Do We Go?, supra n. __, 
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drugs.   Professor Richard Merrill once quipped that “[a]ll consumers of prescription drugs serve84
as guinea pigs for the pharmaceutical industry.”    So the question that the FDA has long faced is85
how to acquire information about risks systematically once a drug has been approved.  Until
recently, for most new drugs the FDA “could count on cautious practicing physicians to assure a
gradual, measured roll-out” that would permit the agency time to assess actual marketing
experience.   86
But those days are gone, mainly for two reasons.  First, as a result of the 1992 user fee
legislation, the FDA devotes enormous resources to expediting the new drug review process. 
With the infusion of $400 million or more annually in user-fees, the FDA is now generally the
first regulatory agency in the world to approve new drugs, and thus the agency cannot look to
experiences elsewhere in evaluating an NDA.  87
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at 45 (statement of Bruce Psaty) (stating that “drug recalls following approval increased from
1.56 percent in 1993-1996 up to 5.35 percent for 1997-2001.”)
 Merck, for example, trumpeted the FDA’s approval of Vioxx with what it proclaimed88
to be its “biggest, fastest, and best launch ever.”  See, e.g., Robert Langreth, FDA Approval of
Vioxx Allows Merck to Compete with New Arthritis Drugs, Wall S. J., May 24, 1999, at B3.  
  A 2005 study found that $4.2 billion was spent on DTC advertising annually, or 37%89
of total pharmaceutical advertising.  Kaiser Family Foundation, Prescription Drug Trends, May
2007, http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/3057_06.pdf.  To put these expenditures in context, the
pharmaceutical industry spends as much money on advertising as the tobacco industry spends on
all of its product promotion (including price reductions and samples).  Compare id., with
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CIGARETTE REPORT FOR 2003, at 2 (2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/cigarette05/050809cigrpt.pdf (reporting that the tobacco industry
spent a total of $15.15 billion in 2003 to promote its products).  To give one example, in 2000,
Vioxx was the number one DTC-advertised drug – at $160 million, larger than the campaigns
that year for Pepsi and Budweiser – and retail sales of Vioxx quadrupled.  NATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MASS MEDIA ADVERTISING, 2000,
at 5 (2001) available at http://www.nihcm.org/DTCbrief2001.pdf.
 Several studies have shown that DTC advertising does have an impact on patients and90
doctors. An assessment by the National Institute for Health Care Management found that
between 1999 and 2000 the number of prescriptions written for the 50 most advertised drugs rose
24.6%, as compared to a 4.3% increase in prescriptions for all other drugs, although this study
did not take into account the fact that these drugs are also heavily promoted to doctors.  See n.__,
supra; see also GAO Prescription Drugs: FDA Oversight of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising has
Limitations 16 (GAO-03-177) (Oct. 2002) (“surveys...consistently show that DTC
advertisements have an impact on whether consumers request and receive a specific brand-name
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Second, and perhaps more daunting, drug companies often launch mass marketing
campaigns for their drugs directed at consumers, not just doctors, as soon as they obtain FDA
approval.   Drug companies spend over $27 billion annually to promote their products, including88
$11.4 billion on advertising.  Nearly forty percent of the advertising expenditures — over $4.2
billion annually — pay for direct-to-consumer (DTC) ads that are designed to encourage patients
to ask their doctors to prescribe the advertised drug.   DTC advertising has proven to be highly89
successful in stimulating demand for drugs.   As a result of these developments, for many drugs90
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prescription”).  The FDA also has problems regulating the content of these ads, some of which
the FDA has found misleading.  See id. at 22-23 (“reviews of draft regulatory letters from FDA
have taken so long that misleading advertisements may have completed their broadcast life cycle
before FDA issued the letters.”); see also Barry Meier, et al., Medicine Fueled by Marking
Intensified Trouble for Pain Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at 1 (finding that COX-2 drugs are
“perhaps the clearest instance yet of how the confluence of medicine and marketing can turn
hope into hype” and stating that Vioxx and Celebrex are examples of “how difficult it is for the
Food and Drug Administration to monitor the safety of drugs after they have been approved for
the market.”).
 More than 19 million prescriptions for Celebrex were written its first year on the91
market, largely due to a massive DTC ad campaign.  See Diedtra Henderson, How Safe Is
Celebrex?, Boston Globe, D1 (Feb. 25, 2007).  During the five years Vioxx was on the market,
over 100 million prescriptions were written for drug for an estimated 20 million patients.  See In
re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48367 (E.D. La. July 3, 2007).
 IOM REPORT, supra n. __, at 153.92
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there is no longer a transitional period between pre- and post-approval.  Drugs that have been
tested in controlled clinical trials involving at most a few thousand patients are, within a few
weeks after approval, being prescribed by thousands of doctors to perhaps hundreds of thousands
of patients.     91
Despite these new pressures on the agency, its ability to systematically gather and
evaluate post-marketing information has not kept pace and is far from optimal.  According to the
IOM, “[t]he existing regulatory framework is structured around the premarketing testing process;
few tools are available for addressing postmarketing safety issues, short of the blunt instruments
available to respond to clear-cut adulteration and misbranding.”  92
 The “blunt instruments” available to the FDA are two far-from-perfect tools.  First, the
FDA often requires companies to perform post-marketing studies (so-called Phase IV studies) to
see how the drug performs when given to large numbers of patients over a period of a year or
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 The FDA’s authority to mandate Phase IV studies is clearly set forth in statute only93
where the drug received accelerated approval (typically drugs for life-threatening diseases),
where preapproval human subject studies of drugs for protection against chemical, radiological
or nuclear materials are barred by ethical issues, or where the use of an approved drug for
children requires study.  21 U.S.C. § 356(b)(2) (2000) (for “fast-track” drugs); 21 U.S.C. § 355c
(Supp. 2004) (for pediatric studies); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.610(b)(1), 601.91(b)(1) (for drugs that
protect against chemical, radiological and nuclear materials); see generally Steenburg, supra n.
__, at 343-44.  In those cases in which the FDA wants a company to engage in a Phase IV study
of a drug that does not fall into one of these categories, the agency generally imposes the Phase
IV study as a condition of approval.  The FDA claims that FDCA § 505(k), 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)
(2000), which requires drug companies to “establish and maintain” records of “data relating to
clinical experience and other data,” and to report this information to the agency, empowers the
agency to require Phase IV studies whenever it sees fit.  That interpretation of section 505(k) has
been questioned by drug company lawyers.  See Steenburg, supra n.__, at 343.  
 Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, FDA Requested Postmarketing94
Studies in 73% of Recent New Drug Approvals, IMPACT REPORT, July/August 2004, at 2,
available at http://csdd.tufts.edu/InfoServices/ImpactReportPDFs/SampleIssue2005.pdf. 
 GAO REPORT, supra n. __, at 28 (citing id.).  At least in some cases, there may be95
sound reasons for the FDA’s failure to demand that companies initiate and complete Phase IV
studies.  For one thing, the FDA may be uncertain of its legal authority under section 505(k), and
thus may be reluctant to force the issue.  See supra note 80.  For another, once a drug is approved
and is accepted by physicians, it becomes more difficult for a manufacturer to find participants
meeting necessary criteria who are willing to enroll in the study (thereby risking getting a
placebo) and more difficult to secure institutional review board approval for a double-blind study
with a placebo group.  See Steenburg, supra n.__, at 372-73.  Drug companies may also be
reluctant to conduct comparative efficacy studies for fear that their products will not measure up
to other drugs on the market.  IOM REPORT, supra n. __115-16.
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more.    Indeed, recent studies show that the FDA requires Phase IV testing in nearly three-93
quarters of all new drug approvals.   But the FDA has been lax in its oversight of Phase IV94
studies.  Fewer than one-quarter of the Phase IV studies required by the FDA have ever been
completed and many have never been started.   95
In addition to requiring Phase IV studies, the FDA monitors post-approval performance
by gathering reports of adverse reactions through its Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS)
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 21 C.F.R. § 310.305 (2006).  96
 The MedWatch program was inaugurated by the FDA in 1993 to enable the FDA to97
obtain adverse reaction reports directly from physicians and other health care providers, thereby
skipping the intermediate step of having such reports go first to the drug companies.  See David
A. Kessler, Introducing MedWatch: A New Approach to Reporting Medication and Device
Adverse Effects and Product Problems, 269 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 2765 (1993).  The MedWatch
program is described in depth on the FDA’s website.  Food and Drug Administration MedWatch,
http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/index.html (last visited June 15, 2007).
  Reauthorization of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Hearing Before the Sucomm.98
on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107  Cong. 49 (2002) (statement of Rep.th
Henry A. Waxman).  
 See Steenburg, supra n. __, at 298.  Steenburg also points out that such systems require99
reporting but do not require manufacturers to “develop their own data-gathering efforts or
otherwise track clinical experiences in an organized manner.”  Id. 
 This is the so-called “denominator” problem, which is addressed in FOOD AND DRUG100
ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD PHARMACOVIGILANCE PRACTICES AND
PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGIC ASSESSMENT 11 (2005).  See also GAO DRUG SAFETY, supra n. __, 
at 24; IOM REPORT, supra n. __, at 53-54.    
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and its “MedWatch” program.  Under the AERS, companies have a duty to report adverse
reactions to the FDA, and to report serious or life-threatening adverse reactions quickly.  96
MedWatch extends the reporting program, on a voluntary basis, to health professionals and
consumers.   Even with these programs in place, most adverse reactions go unreported to the97
FDA.   As a result, many serious adverse reactions escape the FDA’s attention.   Moreover,98 99
adverse reactions reports are of limited utility from an epidemiological standpoint because the
FDA does not know how many people are using the drug or have information about their
conditions and therefore may have difficulty determining the incidence of an adverse reaction.    100
Finally, even when the FDA identifies an unanticipated risk, the agency’s statutory
authority gives it only limited options to remedy or ameliorate the problem.   As noted above, the
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 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 355(e).  A drug is “misbranded” if its labeling is false or101
misleading, does not provide adequate directions for use, or warnings against any use dangerous
to health.  Id. at §§ 331(a), (b) & (k); and id. at §§ 352(a), (f), and (g).  
 Indeed, all of the ten drugs withdrawn from the market between 2000 and 2006 were102
withdrawn voluntarily by the drug’s sponsor.  GAO DRUG SAFETY, supra n. __, at 10.  
 “Black box” warnings signal a high degree of risk and are taken seriously by103
physicians and patients.  21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e); see generally Judith E. Beach, et al., Black Box
Warnings in Prescription Drug Labeling: Results of a Survey of 206 Drugs, 53 Food & Drug L.J.
403 (1998).  As discussed above, Merck and the FDA did battle for more than a year over
whether the heart attacks and stroke risks warranted a black box warning for Vioxx.  The FDA
finally relented, and agreed to a warning that simply said that patients with a history of heart
disease should use Vioxx with caution.  See Gardiner Harris, FDA Official Admits “Lapses” on
Vioxx, N.Y. Times, A1 (Mar. 2, 2005).
 See id. at 10; IOM REPORT, supra n. __, at 157.104
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agency has no statutory right to direct a company to add warnings to the label of an approved
drug.  The statutory options available to the FDA — initiate a proceeding to withdraw the drug’s
NDA or file a misbranding action against the drug company  — are so Draconian that they are101
rarely employed by the FDA.    The FDA’s threat to take action does give the agency bargaining102
leverage to persuade companies to add warnings the companies would otherwise omit or would
not voluntarily place in a prominent, “black box” warning.   But, as both the Institute of103
Medicine and the Government Accountability Office point out, because the agency cannot simply
require labeling changes, negotiations between the FDA and drug companies over labeling issues
are often drawn out, often result in compromises, and, as a result, often have adverse effects on
safety.   104
C.  Litigation Uncovers Information Within the Control of Drug Companies 
That Is  Otherwise Unavailable to the FDA.  
Failure-to-warn litigation exposes the shortcomings in the FDA’s statutory authority to
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  See generally Kesselheim & Avorn supra n. __ , and authorities cited therein.  105
 Section 505(b)(1)(A)-(F) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A)-(F).  An NDA must106
contain, among other things, “full reports of investigations which have been made to show
whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use.”  
 See FDCA § 505(k), 21 U.S.C. § 355(k).107
 See supra at ___.  108
 See FDCA § 704, 21 U.S.C. § 374.109
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gather information.   Prior to a drug’s approval, drug companies are required under the new105
drug application provisions of the FDCA to provide the FDA with all data — positive and
negative — relating to the drug’s safety and effectiveness, chemical formulation, proposed
manufacturing, and patent protection.   But companies are not under an obligation to provide106
the agency with records of internal discussions or evaluations by company physicians and
scientists.  Post-approval, the FDA’s information-gathering power is more limited.  Companies
have an ongoing obligation to provide to the FDA records “relating to clinical experience”  and107
adverse reactions,  and have a duty to permit the FDA to review business records during the108
course of a factory inspection.  But companies have no obligation to provide the FDA with the109
company’s evaluations of the drug’s performance in the market, let alone the company’s
assessment (memos, E-mails, and so forth) of the drug’s safety profile.  So while the FDA has
substantial information-gathering power, its authority is by no means comprehensive.  
The information-gathering tools lawyers have in litigation are, by any measure, more
extensive than the FDA’s.  Indeed, the FDCA does not give the FDA the most important tool
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 Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-27, 45, with 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(k), 374.  Under the Federal110
Rules, any party to civil litigation in federal court may compel any person to provide testimony
under oath or furnish records relevant, or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any
information relevant, to any issue.  State discovery rules are generally equally permissive.  As
noted above, the FDA’s information-gathering power is much more limited.  The FDA’s
authority does not reach evaluations and other analyses performed by companies about the
performance of their drugs, let alone to company E-mails and internal deliberations over possible
safety hazards.  It is an odd system that gives plaintiff’s lawyers far more leeway to probe
company records than the FDA, but that is the system that exists today.  See David C. Vladeck,
Defending Courts: A Brief Rejoinder to Professors Fried and Rosenberg, 31 Seton Hall L. Rev.
631 (2001) (explaining comparative advantage plaintiff’s lawyers engaged in civil litigation have
in information-gathering over agency officials).  We do not suggest that the FDA, as a matter of
routine, should be provided internal company documents.  We do suggest that the agency ought
to have the authority, when necessary, to examine any company record relating to scientific
information that may be relevant to the FDA’s regulatory responsibilities, even where that
information does not appear in reports required to be filed with the agency.  
 See Alex Berenson & Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Says 1999 Trials Revealed Risks With111
Celebrex, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2005, at C1.  An equally telling example is reported regarding the
antipsychotic medication olanzapine.  Lawsuits filed after the drug’s approval alleged that the
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trial lawyers have — the right to subpoena relevant information from any source.   A few110
examples drawn from the litigation over Vioxx and Celebrex make this point.  For instance,
litigation uncovered the fact that Pfizer, the maker of Celebrex, conducted an unpublished
clinical study in 1999 to see if Celebrex could be used to treat Alzheimer’s disease.  That study
showed a statistically significant increase in heart attacks.  But Pfizer waited to submit the study
to the FDA until 2001 — after the FDA convened an advisory committee meeting to consider
whether drugs of Celebrex’s class should carry warnings for heart attack and stroke.  The
advisory committee recommended a warning be added to the labeling for Vioxx, Celebrex’s
main competitor.  But without the Pfizer study linking Celebrex to increased heart attacks and
strokes, the committee did not make a similar recommendation for Celebrex.   111
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manufacturer, Eli Lilly, recognized that the drug was linked to weight gain and diabetes, but did
not warn patients about the risks.  In September 2003, after the litigation was filed, the FDA
required Lilly to change the drug’s label to warn about the diabetes-related adverse effects. 
During litigation, documents were uncovered that Lilly had long downplayed the research
showing the links to weight gain and high blood sugar, informing sales-staff “Don’t introduce the
issue!!!”  See Kesselheim & Avorn supra n. __, at 309.  For a detailed treatment of the Celebrex
incident, see McGarity, supra n. __, at 13.  
 Anna W. Mathews & Barbara Martinez, Warning Signs:  E-Mails Suggest Merck112
Knew Vioxx’s Dangers at Early Stage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2004, at A1; see also McGarity,
supra, n. __, at 17. 
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Litigation also brought to light the fact that Merck was acutely concerned about the heart
attack risk associated with Vioxx before the FDA understood the risk, and before Merck alerted
the FDA to the risk.  During the Vioxx cases, the plaintiffs’ lawyers uncovered internal company
memos and E-mails that were not provided to the FDA.  One memo warned that a study of
Vioxx, conducted to show that it decreased the risk of gastrointestinal bleeding, should be
limited to patients also taking aspirin; otherwise there would be a “substantial chance that
significantly higher rates” of cardiovascular disease would show up in the Vioxx group.  An
internal E-mail similarly warned that if Vioxx patients did not receive aspirin, “you will get more
thrombotic events and kill [the] drug.”  In response, a senior company doctor agreed that “the
possibility of increased CV [cardiovascular] events is of great concern,” and she recommended
that potential subjects with high risk of cardiovascular problems be kept out of the study so
cardiovascular problems “would not be evident.”    Evidence uncovered in litigation also112
revealed the fact that Merck scientists in 2000 were considering combining Vioxx with other
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 File Shows Merck Sought to Change Vioxx, L.A. Times, June 23, 2005, at C3.  See113
also Heather Won Tesoriero, Attorneys Question Disclosure by Merck of Vioxx-Study Deaths,
Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 2005, at D4 (reporting that litigation uncovered Merck-sponsored studies
finding a high death rate among Alzheimer’s patients taking Vioxx as compared to placebo
group).  
 Wagner, supra n. __, at 707 n.73, and 711 & nn.79-82 (and authorities cited therein).  114
 See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, Spitzer Sues a Drug Maker, Saying It Hid Negative Data,115
N.Y. Times (June 3, 2004), A1; see also Press Release, Office of the New York State Attorney
General, Settlement Sets New Standard for Release of Drug Information (Aug. 26, 2004)
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agents to reduce the risk of heart attacks and strokes.113
These recent examples echo prior FDA experience.  Litigation brought to light the risks
associated with the sleeping medication Halcion, the arthritis medication Zomax, ultra-absorbent
tampons, and the weight loss pill ephedra, leading the FDA to take Halcion, Zomax, and ephedra
off the market, and to more rigorously regulate tampons.   Litigation also revealed evidence that114
manufacturers of a certain class of anti-depression medication — selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSRIs) — withheld adverse event data regarding children.  The issue was pushed into
the spotlight in June 2004 when New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer brought a civil
action against GlaxoSmithKline, alleging that the company had fraudulently withheld clinical
studies showing that its SSRI drug, Paxil, increased the risk of suicide in children and young
adults but did not effectively treat their depression.  The complaint further alleged that the
company’s internal memos urged company officials to “manage the dissemination of data in
order to minimize any potential negative commercial impact” while, at the same time, the
company told its sales representatives to tell doctors that “Paxil demonstrates remarkable efficacy
and safety in the treatment of adolescent depression.”   Three months later, GlaxoSmithKline115
Kessler & Vladeck, 96 Geo. L.J. ___ (2008) (forthcoming)
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/aug/aug26a_04.html (last visited July 13,
2007).
 See supra n.__.  See also Shankar Vedantam, Depression Drugs to Carry A Warning;116
FDA Orders Notice of Risks to Youths, Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 2004, at A1.  
 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-360m. 117
 21 U.S.C. § 301.  118
 By the early 1990s, there had already been a number of lawsuits against silicone gel119
breast implant manufacturers, some of which ended in sealed settlements, but some of which
ended in judgments against the manufacturers.  See Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty
in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 19-21 (1995).  Some scientists reported that
silicone breast implants could cause a serious autoimmune disorder.  See, e.g., Researcher Says
Breast Implants May Be Linked To Autoimmune Disease, Cancer Weekly, Dec. 21, 1992, at 16. 
Others reported a high incidence of rupture, running as high as thirty percent at five years, fifty
percent at ten years, and seventy percent at seventeen years.  J.S. Marotta et al., Silicone Gel
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settled the case by, among other things, agreeing to make its data public.  Shortly thereafter, the
FDA required warnings on SSRIs to highlight the association between use of SSRIs and an
increased suicide risk in children and adolescents.   116
Litigation helped force silicone gel breast implant makers to conduct long-overdue safety
studies of their products.   In 1976, Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments to the
FDCA.  Part of that law required manufacturers of medical devices on the market in 1976 to117
submit health and safety data to the FDA showing that the device was safe for its intended use.  118
In May 1990, the FDA called for the makers of silicone gel breast implants to provide safety
information for their products.  It was not produced.  After giving the implant manufacturers
several extensions, the FDA ultimately withdrew the implants from the market.  The agency took
this drastic step, not because there was evidence proving the implants to be unsafe (although
there was evidence raising safety concerns),  but because the industry failed to submit evidence119
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Breast Implant Failure and Frequency of Additional Surgeries: Analysis of 33 Studies Reporting
Examination of More Than 8,000 Explants, J. Biomed. Materials Res. 48(3):354-64 (1999).  In
1999, a study by the Institute of Medicine did not find a greater risk of chronic illness in women
with silicone implants.  IOM, Safety of Silicone Breast Implants (1999) available at:
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309065321/html. 
 David A. Kessler, The Basis of the FDA’s Decision on Breast Implants, 326 New Eng.120
J. Med. 1713, 1715 (1992).  Even Marcia Angell, a critic of the breast implant litigation,
acknowledges that these legal interventions led to long delayed scientific research on implants. 
Marcia Angell, Shattuck Lecture — Evaluating the Health Risks of Breast Implants: The
Interplay of Medical Science, the Law, and Public Opinion, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 1513, 1515
(1996).
 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Galileo’s Tribute: Using Medical Evidence in121
Court, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2055, 2070 (1997) (discussing competing views); Feldman, supra n. __,
at 19-21.  
 Wagner, supra n. __,  at 715 & nn.95-97 (and authorities cited therein).   122
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showing that the implants did not pose an unreasonable risk when used as intended.   Whatever120
one might think about the breast implant product liability litigation,  there is no doubt that the121
litigation “was uniquely successful in divulging important, asymmetric information about the
risks of implants held by implant manufacturers,” including information that one major implant
manufacturer not only knew that its implants were leaking, but suppressed internal research on
the few animal studies that had been conducted to assess the risks associated with the leakage.   122
We could go on.  But we do not believe that there is any serious dispute on this point. 
Statutory gaps in the FDA’s authority to gather information, especially post-approval, hamstring
its ability to ensure the safety of the drugs on the market.  Failure-to-warn litigation brings to
light information that would not otherwise be available to the FDA, to doctors, to other health
care providers, and to consumers.  At some point, Congress may close the gaps in the FDCA and
give the agency comprehensive authority to obtain whatever records it deems necessary to do its
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 As of this writing, Congress is considering drug safety legislation that would123
strengthen the FDA’s ability to force drug companies to accept labeling changes the FDA deems
necessary, increase the agency’s information-gathering authority, and clarify the obligation of
drug companies to report data to the FDA.  See Food and Drug Administration Revitalization
Act, S.1082, 110th Cong. (2007) (as passed by the Senate on May 9, 2007); Enhancing Drug
Safety and Innovation Act of 2007, H.R. 2900, 110th Cong. (2007); see also Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress, FDA Legislation in the 110  Congress: A Guide to S.th
1082 and H.R. 2900 (July 18, 2007)..  These are important measures, but our views about
preemption would not change even if they are adopted.  Enhancing the FDA’s statutory authority
does not solve the agency’s resource problems.  Nor would it ensure that physicians and patients
have timely access to up-to-date safety information for approved drugs. And this essay has
steered clear of the corrective justice rationale underlying state-law damage claims — a rationale
we believe independently justifies the preservation of state-law claims by injured consumers, but
has been addressed in-depth by other commentators.  See n.__ supra.  
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work.  But that day has not come.  And closing that gap would not guarantee that emerging safety
information is made available to physicians and patients, who need it just as much as the FDA.123
 V.  Conclusion 
The point of this essay is not to denigrate the job the FDA does in protecting consumers. 
The talented and dedicated men and women who work at the FDA do an admirable job with the
tools they have been given.  But those tools are imperfect, and the FDA cannot, at least at this
point, effectively safeguard our nation’s drug supply on its own.  In an ideal world, the FDA
would have immediate access to data enabling it to pinpoint problems as they emerge, the
personnel and other resources needed to deal effectively and swiftly with emerging hazards, and
the insulation from political and other forces that often seek to apply pressure to influence agency
decision-making.  In the meantime, however, we believe it would be a mistake to broadly
preempt state-law failure-to-warn cases, which impose a complementary discipline on the
marketplace, prompt disclosure of safety information that is not otherwise available to the FDA
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and the public, and provide redress for consumers injured through no fault of their own.
